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1. Introduction 
This review of the literature on the 2007-09 crisis discusses the pre-crisis conditions, the crisis 
triggers, and the asset-backed commercial paper effects. The pre-crisis conditions contributed 
to the housing price bubble and the following price decline that led to a risk crisis in which 
liquidity shrank due to insolvency concerns. Rather than selling the mortgages or 
mortgage‐backed securities directly into financial markets, some large banks moved them to 
firms out of the banks’ balance sheets and financed these firms by issuing commercial paper. 
The result was an unprecedented increase in the volume of outstanding asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) from 2005 until the financial crisis hit in mid‐2007, where the 
collapse started. 
This paper provides a comprehensive introduction to asset backed commercial paper 
programs. It focuses on the construction of ABCP structures mentioning risks, backed funds, 
and typical assets purchased or financed by these structures. Afterwards, it documents the role 
of asset-backed commercial papers in the financial market and the implications for banks as 
liquidity providers. 
Asset-backed commercial paper rollover risk was an important factor at an early stage of the 
financial crisis. The asymmetric information about the credibility of the value of assets 
backed by commercial papers in the summer of 2007, staged anxiety through ABCP 
purchasers. Due to its short maturity time and high ratings, buyers had viewed asset-backed 
commercial paper as a very low-risk security, but the consciousness about the real value of 
these assets caused an immediate decline in the market and trading in ABCP dried up. The 
plunge in outstanding ABCP volume started in the third quarter of 2007 and continued for a 
year. The total value of asset-backed commercial paper outstanding fell by 37 percent, from 
$1.18 trillion in August 2007 to $745 billion in August 2008. Concluding, this paper shows 
that as the crises deepened, the drop in asset-backed commercial paper market and 
withdrawals in financial institutions are strongly correlated with the risk perception of 
investors.    
  
5 
 
2. Financial Crisis 
 
2.1. Definition of a financial crisis 
Financial crises are not a new phenomenon. Historically, the world’s economy has gone 
through financial crises and the current one is most probably not the last one that mankind 
will experience. There is a considerable literature on the subject (e.g. Calomiris and Gorton, 
1991; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Charles, Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Gorton, 2010; and 
Thakor, 2015). However, in order to understand the 2007-09 global financial crisis and its 
implications, it is important to initially define what a financial crisis is. 
A financial crisis is a situation in which the value of financial assets drops rapidly and as a 
result, banks cease to advance funds to others. The latter begin to demand early repayments of 
loans and other financial instruments, liquidate holdings of financial assets that can be sold 
and increase collateral requirements to a degree that exceeds the expectations of market 
participants. This leads to a “freezing” of financial markets, where trading volumes fall 
considerably and parties cannot be induced to trade financial instruments no matter what 
prices are offered (Financial Times).  
This causes wide-scale fear of wealth loss between private individuals, further contributing to 
the crisis by selling off investments, securities or withdrawing money from their bank 
accounts as they believe that the values of those assets will plump if they remain in a financial 
institution. This means that liquidity evaporates causing banks and other financial institutions 
to call in their loans and to further liquidate holdings of financial assets. This wide range of 
financial assets can be subject to such simultaneous “loss of confidence” including stocks, 
government bonds, bank deposits, asset backed securities and insurance contracts (Financial 
Times). After this quick overview of what a financial crisis is, this paper will now dive into 
the causes and consequences of these economic meltdowns. 
 
2.2. Evolution of 2007-09 crisis 
The 2007 crisis began when the real estate bubble1 burst and many high rates mortgages 
defaulted. The rapid string of sell-offs brought lower asset prices and more savings were 
                                                 
1 A housing bubble is a run-up in housing prices fueled by demand, speculation and the belief that recent history 
is an infallible forecast of the future. Housing bubbles usually start with an increase in demand, in the face of 
limited supply which takes a relatively long period of time to replenish and increase. Speculators enter the 
market, believing that profits can be made through short-term buying and selling. This further drives demand, 
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withdrawn. The assets that were overvalued caused wild sell-offs, and this further deteriorated 
the situation leading to a loss of welfare and recession. 
 
2.2.1. The boom 
These last decades were represented by a remarkably high amount of macroeconomic 
stability. Since the Great Depression to the Crisis of 2007-2009, we can see what economists 
such as Steven J. Davis and James Kahn (2008); James Stock and Mark Watson (2003) 
describe as the “great moderation”: -an interval with less recession, with a moderate volatility 
of growth and with less risk of loss. The great moderation was a prosperous time period that 
only in retrospect we have linked to the rise of house prices of the aforementioned economic 
meltdown. 
In this phase, one of the factors that contributed to low-inflation was the Federal Reserve that 
decreased the Federal fund rates from 6,5% in May 2000 to 1,75% in December 2001, 
creating an overflow of liquidity in the economy. The Fed continued to lower interest rates, 
and in June 2003, it arrived in 1%, - the lowest rate of the past 45 years (See graph 1).  
 
Graph 1: Federal Funds Rate 1995-2007; Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve. 
 
With the interest rates being at their lowest point, and with moderate growth, individuals 
became confident that the value of houses would increase. Some borrowers naively trusted 
mortgage brokers who earned more money placing them in risky loans rather than safer ones. 
                                                                                                                                                        
that at some point decreases, or stagnates at the same time supply increases, resulting in a sharp drop in prices - 
and the bubble bursts.  
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They began to borrow large amounts of money relative to their incomes. Lenders also became 
more confident that they could lend large quantities of money fueled by what they expected to 
be a rising value of houses as a financial asset. So the house prices rose considerably with 
prices doubling and even tripling in many countries (see figure I). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I: The boom phase. A stylized picture; Source: Riksrevisionen (2010): The 
Causes of the Global Financial Crisis and their Implications for Supreme Audit 
Institutions. Swedish National Audit Office, Stockholm. 
 
 However, the growth in demand for mortgages was not coordinated by a growth in bank 
deposits, thus financial institutions faced the challenge of having to find funds elsewhere. 
This situation made them progressively more vulnerable on the wholesale of funding markets.  
Over time, banks became more and more confident and alleviated credit conditions. They also 
distributed mortgages to subprime borrowers with poor credit histories who could not repay 
them and, -who were least equipped to handle the payments. This contributed to the financial 
crisis as lenders originated poor quality loans then sold them on the secondary market, 
passing risks to investors. Loan lenders used different types of mortgages to allow debtors 
with a low credit profile to afford these loans. These types of loans were principally nonprime 
loans, which contain sub-prime and Alt-A loans that typically did not have documentation of 
borrowers’ incomes and have higher loan-to-value or debt-to-income ratios, which grew 
dramatically (Audit Institution, Stockholm, 2010). The mortgages were collected into exotic 
financial assets, with different performance levels, that were given high ratings by credit 
ratings agencies, and were sold to investors looking for high earnings at low risk (investors 
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included many other banks and financial institutions totally unconnected with housing 
markets). Now even the worst loans could find a buyer. 
Gorton and Metrick (2009) report that about $2.5 trillion of subprime mortgages were 
initiated between 2001 and 2006, with half of them given during the time period 2005-06. 
Low interest rates and simpler lending proceedings assured the expansion in debt borrowings. 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) document that the quality of loans deteriorated for six 
consecutive years prior to the crisis2. These mortgages were securitized at an increasing rate. 
Gorton and Metrick (2009) also reveal that 70% of subprime originations in 2005 and 2006 
were securitized into Residential Mortgage Backed Securities. Private sector and investment 
banks developed new ways of securitizing subprime mortgages. By packing them into 
“Collateralized Debt Obligations3”, overnight repurchase agreements (repo loans)4, and other 
asset-backed securities (especially asset-backed commercial papers). They detached the cash 
flows into diverse “tranches” to appeal to different categories of investors with different 
tolerance levels for risk. Institutions such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers borrowed at 
very short term and held risky longer-term assets, with low levels of capital or reserves to 
cover changing market conditions. When short-term liquidity funding’s like ABCPs and repos 
suddenly dried up, these financial institutions effectively faced a “run” and founded 
themselves exposed with very little capital. Mian and Sufi (2008) demonstrated empirically 
that the capacity to securitize subprime loans was the determinant factor in boosting the 
housing bubble. Asset price bubbles are represented by a self-strengthening cycle where price 
increases cause prices to increase even more. However, as the level of asset prices moves out 
of line, the bubble gets leaner and leaner until it finally bursts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The quality is measured as the performance of loans, adjusted for differences in borrower characteristics like 
the credit score, level of indebtedness, loan amount and ability to provide documentation; differences in loan 
characteristics like product type, amortization term, loan amount, and mortgage interest rate; and 
macroeconomic conditions like house price appreciation, level of neighborhood income, and change in 
unemployment. 
3 Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are a type of structured credit product in the world of asset-backed 
securities. The purpose of these products is to create tiered cash flows from mortgages and other debt obligations 
that ultimately make the entire cost of lending cheaper for the aggregate economy. 
4Overnight repos are a form of “collateralized borrowing” whereby a bank pledges its assets as collateral in an 
overnight loan with another bank. 
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2.2.2. The bust 
More home loans led to more homebuyers and consequently more appreciation in home 
prices. This increase in the demand for houses, made possible by the housing price bubble, 
had a significant role in the crisis that was to come. As the growth continued, the economy 
became more and more exposed to negative stimuli. Holt (2009) stresses that the initial drop 
in the value of houses was a moderate 2% from the beginning of 2006 until the end of the 
year. This small recession in housing values sparked an immediate reaction for the high risk 
debtors. Liebowitz (2008) records that the foreclosure rates raised by 43% towards the end of 
2006, a shocking 75% increase compared to the previous year. The defaults on the mortgages 
started to increase in considerable numbers and led to unexpected losses on the product 
values, leaving investors holding huge amounts of ‘risky’ assets that in the worst case would 
become worthless. The decline in house prices meant that the homeowners (especially the 
ones with flexible rate loans) had negative impartiality in their houses (since most of them did 
not put capital in the beginning). When the rates increased they found themselves paying even 
higher monthly loans fees. 
As these debtors defaulted, credit rating agencies began to undervalue mortgage-backed 
securities; the initial negative impulse that turned the boom into bust (Marshall, 2009). The 
value of asset backed commercial papers declined by almost 300 billion dollars during the 
second half of 2007 and banks that provided support financing for those asset-backed issues 
started facing liquidity pressures. This constricted credit markets, increased lending rates and, 
decreased asset prices (e.g. home value), speeding up the decline of this spiral prices. The 
repayment capacity of prime borrowers was further threatened. As asset values fell, 
individuals and companies become over-indebted. The anticipated increase in negative risk 
was reflected in a decrease in the supply of credit. Banks created off-balanced sheet affiliated 
entities such as Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to purchase mortgage-related assets 
that were not subject to regulatory capital requirements (Baily, Johnson and Litan, 2008). 
While securitization was made to spread out risks precisely the opposite occurred.  
These innovative securities led to higher risks in the industry and eventually these risks led to 
higher-than-expected defaults, causing the securities to fall out of favor with investors, 
precipitating the crisis (Thakor, 2015). Investors started to sell assets to meet liabilities, 
causing a dangerous circle of mortgage-collapse pressuring asset values even lower. This 
situation was explained also by Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny’s (2012) model, where new 
securities with high risks, that investors ignore, are swamped to meet high initial demand, and 
then dropped by investors when a perception of the risks causes a shuttle to safety, letting the 
financial institutions to carry the risky securities. The real economy slows down as savings 
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increase. Hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and mortgage-related 
securities disrupted markets and financial institutions that had significant exposures to those 
mortgages and had borrowed heavily against them. The boom turned into a bust characterized 
by, financial crisis, bank failures and a period of economic depression (See figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The bust phase. A stylized picture; Source: Riksrevisionen (2010): The Causes 
of the Global Financial Crisis and their Implications for Supreme Audit Institutions. 
Swedish National Audit Office, Stockholm. 
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3. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
Asset-backed commercial papers emerged for the first time in the middle of 1980. They have 
been an important category in the short-term markets for decades. Asset-backed commercial 
paper programs grew rapidly in the 1990s and then again in the crucial global saving glut 
period5 from 2003 to 2007. ABCP played a central role during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. Before analyzing the impact of asset-backed commercial papers in the crisis we need to 
understand the function that they have in the economy. 
 
3.1. What is an asset-backed commercial paper? 
Asset-backed commercial paper is primarily a method of maturity transformation, a way to 
fund a group of long-term assets with short term liabilities. ABCP is an unsecured corporate 
debt, meaning that it is backed not by a guarantee of collateral but only by the corporation’s 
promise to pay. As Bate, Bushweller and Rutan (2003) highlight, - “asset-backed commercial 
paper are a form of senior secured, short-term borrowing, that offer low-cost financing to 
companies that could not otherwise directly borrow in the commercial paper market”. ABCP 
is designed to meet specific needs of investors, which often are money market mutual funds. 
It will include different improvement for credit and liquidity, so it can meet those specific 
goals. By 2000, commercial paper had risen to $1.6 trillion from less than $125 billion in 
1980 (National Commission of US, February 2011). 
For issuers, asset-backed commercial paper is a way of raising capital economically at a short-
term interest rate. For investors, asset-backed commercial paper offers return slightly higher 
than Treasury bill in exchange for taking on minimal credit risk (Andrew Metrick, 2015). In 
this way ABCP allows financial institutions to offer a new funding option for their clients by 
merging their assets to back the paper6. With asset-backed commercial papers the mutual 
funds could earn solid returns, stable companies could borrow at a reduced price and Wall 
Street firms could earn for putting the deals together. This type of commercial paper is 
considered a very safe investment because only financially stable corporations are considered 
able to issue ABCP.  
                                                 
5 Global saving glut describes a situation in which desired saving exceeds desired investment. Bernanke, 
chairman of the Federal Reserve was the first one correlating the significant increase in the global supply of 
saving with the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
6 These assets may consist of trade receivables, auto loans, student loans, corporate loans, or other types of 
financial assets. 
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The maturity of ABCP can reach a maximum of 270 days, after this period the asset must be 
repaid. The borrowers usually “roll them over”7 when the loan came due, and then again and 
again. The purpose of this “short maturity time” is to avoid having to register the securities at 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)8, so reducing the costs of reporting and 
agreements.  
Nearly all ABCP programs are rated by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. 
Ratings reflect the ability of the program to pay in full and on time. Short-term prime ratings, 
assigned by Moody’s Investors Service, are P-1 (the highest), P-2, and P-3 (the lowest). The 
majority of asset-backed commercial paper programs have a P-1 rating by Moody’s because 
they are secured by receivables and over collateralized, they are secured by highly rated and 
various groups of securities, or they have contractual support characteristics (Moody’s ,2007). 
Ratings generally determine the qualification of paper for purchase by money market funds. 
 
 
3.2. How is it issued? 
The emanation of ABCP begins with the seller of the security’s prime assets (e.g. a bank that 
wants to sell its credit card balances or a corporate that wants to sell its corporate loan dues). 
The seller sells its assets to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which is set up by a “backer” (a 
bank or other financial institutions) to emit ABCP. The SPV also is known as the “conduit” or 
“program” because it is responsible for collecting and distributing funds produced by the 
amount of asset-backed commercial paper owned by investors. During the life of the 
investment, the sponsor is responsible for monitoring developments that could affect the 
performance and credit quality of the assets in the SPV, e.g. increased loan delinquencies 
(Frank Gianatasio, 2013). The typical investors in commercial paper, are sensitive not just 
about eventual repayment but also about the timing of repayment because these funds are 
exposed to withdrawals from their own short-term investors. So the sponsor’s role is to 
guarantee that ABCP investors will receive their interest fees and their original amount of 
capital when the credit matures. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 To roll means repaying commercial paper with the proceeds from a new issuance of commercial paper. 
8 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a US government commission created by Congress to 
regulate the securities markets and protect investors 
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3.3. Conduits 
A conduit is a bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicle or entity, which means that it is a 
separate business entity and is not rolled up into the sponsoring company’s balance sheet. The 
assets and debts of ABCP programs are not registered in the sponsoring company’s financial 
accounts9. They are ongoing entities that have a revolving structure, with assets going in and 
out of the pool of collateral that backs the ABCP. There are three categories of conduits: 
multi-seller, single-seller and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). The incomes, from the 
ABCP issuance in multi and single-seller conduits, might be used to fund new mortgages 
loans in the case of mortgage finance company. Each transaction funded by the conduit is 
structured similarly to a term securitization: an originator or Seller of the assets sells them to a 
special purpose vehicle in a true sale (Bate, Bushweller, Rutan, 2003). In some cases, conduits 
fund the purchase of rated securities rather than receivables. The buying SPV is financed by a 
mortgage from the ABCP conduit. The supply of funding depends on the value and credibility 
that the asset has. The conduit agreement will have certain performance triggers to cause early 
payments or limit investors’ exposure to degenerating assets. 
 
 
3.3.1. Types of asset-backed commercial paper conduits 
Fitch Ratings Company published on November 2001 a summary explaining in detail all the 
types of asset-backed commercial paper conduits. They were differentiated by the sponsor’s 
role in referring the assets to be financed through the program as well as the purpose of the 
financing. The first program structure that is introduced is:  
• Single seller – with a sole originator of the conduit’s assets. Often the sponsor of the vehicle 
is the originator of the assets (commonly mortgages) and uses the conduit as an alternative 
source of funding for its own business activities. Most single-seller conduits are extendible, so 
they can extend past the original maturity date if they are unable to roll the ABCP at 
maturity10. 
     •The second one under consideration is: Multi seller program– The conduit buys assets 
(often loans) from a number of different originators (bank and/or other financial institutions). 
The conduit is used to provide off-balance sheet capital market financing for the sponsor’s 
clients, but can also be used by the sponsor. The asset-backed securities that are purchased to 
                                                 
9 This is done to free up the sponsor company’s balance sheet and improve its financial ratios (see “Off-Balance-
Sheet Entities: The good, the Bad and the Ugly”). 
10 To roll means repaying commercial paper with the proceeds from a new issuance of commercial paper. 
However, the extension is not indefinite; they have to auction assets if they cannot roll on the extended deadline. 
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be used in the program are bought from more than one originator. For this reason, a multi-
seller conduit provides more originator diversification and is potentially less risky. Multi-
seller programs also often apply some type of credit improvement that helps to diminish credit 
and liquidity risks. This credit enhancement can be a cash reserve or guarantees from sponsor 
or third-party banks. 
     • Structured investment vehicles (SIVs)– is another form of ABCP conduits/programs. 
Many SIV’s are administered by large commercial banks or other asset managers (investment 
banks or hedge funds). They issue ABCP as a way to fund purchases of investment securities. 
They usually invest the majority of their portfolios in highly-rated securities like, “AAA” and 
“AA” assets, which include an allocation to residential mortgage-backed securities. A partial 
liquidity facility supports timely repayment, and is sized based on an analysis of cash inflows 
and outflows over a one-year time horizon. SIVs operate on a market-value basis. They are 
monitored on a daily basis, and must meet strict liquidity, capitalization, leverage and 
concentration guidelines. 
 
 
3.3.2. How does a conduit work? 
As mentioned by Bate, Bushweller, Rutan (2003), typically, the conduit applies the proceeds 
of new ABCP issuance to repay maturing ABCP, a process called “rolling” ABCP. This 
allows the conduit to fund even long-term assets continuously. Moody’s explain that to ensure 
repayment in the event new asset-backed commercial paper cannot be issued, so to guarantee 
funding to the Seller, each transaction usually has a backup liquidity facility sufficient to 
cover the Face Amount—principal plus interest to maturity—of ABCP issued to fund the 
transaction. This liquidity convenience may absorb different type of risks connected with the 
failure of the seller, but not the ones connected with the defaulters on the individual 
receivables. This means that the liquidity is generally available in an amount equal to that of 
non-defaulted assets (see graph 2). 
The asset-backed commercial paper conduit has certain facilities like credit improvement, 
prevention of agreements, and sub-limit loans for surprising expenses. These facilities are 
needed to confirm if ABCP is repaid on time and entirely, without taking into account if any 
transaction may be causing a problem. As already mentioned asset-backed commercial paper 
programs are structured to prevent registration requirements because they are really expensive 
and time absorbing, and limit the flexibility of the program. 
ABCP conduits are virtual subgroups of the “central” bank. Moody’s says that if the bank 
provides full liquidity support to the conduit, for regulatory purposes, the liquidity support 
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given may be treated as a direct credit substitute. In this case the assets held by the conduit are 
aggregated with those of the bank. Being a low risk and a low return deal asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits are not only arranged by banks, but also by some large issuers that 
launch their own conduits. Given the short maturity, the secured status and credit 
improvements, these securities rarely fail. Furthermore, a company would have to be in a 
really good rank in order to convince a sponsor to guarantee its asset-backed commercial 
papers. 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Generic ABCP Conduit Structure; Source: Asset-backed commercial paper: a 
primer. February 2011 BofA Global Capital Management. 
 
 
3.3.3. Fully and partially supported asset-backed commercial paper programs 
At the end of July 2007, about 87% of programs had explicit liquidity support from at least 
one financial institution in the form of a bank back-up line (see Table I). As an alternative, or 
in some cases a complement to liquidity support from a financial institution, 24% of programs 
at that time issued paper with options that allowed them to extend the maturity of the paper 
past its due date for a fixed period of time at a pre-set penalty rate (Covitz, Liang and Suarez, 
2012). 
ABCP programs can be either fully-supported or partially-supported. A fully supported ABCP 
program is one in which credit support equal to 100 percent of the program’s outstanding 
commercial paper (CP) is in place, while partially supported means that only a fraction of the 
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outstanding CP is covered by a credit enhancement facility (Charles Austin Stone and Anne 
Zissu, 1994). In fully-supported programs the support facility absorbs any losses on the assets 
and provides cash to cover any timing differences with respect to repayment. It typically 
consists in a letter of credit issued by a highly-rated bank (Support Provider), which directly 
guarantees the ABCP. Holders of asset-backed commercial paper, issued under such an 
arrangement, have the right to seek payment directly from the Support Provider if the Issuer 
fails to fully retire ABCP at its maturity. In these programs the Support Provider bears the 
liquidity and the credit risk11.  
Moody’s analysis of a fully-supported program is based on the Holders of asset-backed 
commercial paper issued under such an arrangement have the right to seek payment directly 
from the Support Provider if the Issuer fails to fully retire ABCP at its maturity. In these 
programs the Support Provider bears the liquidity and the credit risk. Moody’s analysis of a 
fully-supported program is based on the financial strength of the support provider, rather than 
on the quality of the assets. If the rating of the support provider is lowered, the rating of the 
ABCP program will most likely be lowered. The fundamental asset is mainly structured with 
some form of first loss credit improvement usually posting more collateral than is needed to 
obtain or secure financing.  
Partially-supported ABCP programs, are qualified for more advantageous treatment under the 
risk-based capital standards, and could continue to offer funding at attractive rates to Sellers. 
In the partially supported programs the investor bares a portion of the credit risk. In this type 
of programs, the support facilities are not intended to fully protect investors from the credit 
risk associated with  
the receivables. Investors must rely, to some degree, on the performance of the receivables in 
which the conduit has acquired an interest. However, if a partially-supported Asset-backed 
commercial paper program has been assigned a rating of Prime-1, the magnitude of the credit 
risk carried by investors must be extremely small to be consistent with that rating. This means 
that the rating of partially-supported programs depends on a joint analysis of the quality of the 
assets and the credit strength of the support facilities. 
                                                 
11 The Support Provider in a fully supported program bears the risk that collections on the receivables in which 
the Issuer has acquired an interest will ultimately be insufficient to fully reimburse the Support Provider for 
payments made to holders of the ABCP. That risk is referred to as the credit risk of the receivables. The Support 
Provider also bears the risk that collections on the receivables, although ultimately received, will not be received 
quickly enough to provide funds to retire maturing ABCP on its scheduled maturity date. That risk is referred to 
as liquidity risk 
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4. Asset-backed commercial paper and the financial crisis of 2007-09 
In January 2007, the total value of commercial paper accounted for $1.97 trillion, of which 
56.8% was asset-backed commercial paper, 34.4% was financial commercial paper, and 5.7% 
was corporate commercial paper (see Kacperczyk, 2013). Making commercial paper the 
largest asset held by money market. 
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2009) illustrate that, in January 2007, 296 conduits were 
authorized to emanate asset-backed commercial paper. The conduits were sustained by 126 
sponsoring financial institutions. The majority of sponsoring financial institutions were large 
commercial banks, many of which sustained more than one conduit. In total, commercial 
banks accounted for $903 billion of asset-backed commercial paper outstanding12. Full credit 
guarantees are designed to prevent capital requirements necessary for assets held by 
commercial banks. An additional number of outstanding commercial paper was issued by 
conduits with extendible notes agreements, which can extend the commercial paper’s maturity 
for a limited period of time. The remaining was issued by structured investment vehicles with 
credit guarantees that typically cover ABCP, but not the longer-maturity debt. At an early 
stage asset-backed commercial paper rollover risk was a one of the causes of the financial  
crisis. When the value of subprime loans became highly unpredictable in the third quarter of 
2007, purchasers of ABCP grew anxious that the assets backing their commercial paper could 
fall in value. They had improperly viewed asset-backed commercial paper as a very low‐risk 
security. The unexpected alertness of risk caused an essential freeze in ABCP purchases and 
trading in ABCP dried up. The crunch is visible in (graph 3), which shows the quick drop in 
outstanding ABCP volume beginning in the third quarter of 2007 that continued for a year. 
Firms that had borrowed by emitting asset-backed commercial paper faced an instantaneous 
risk to their survival. The concern about the value of subprime loans made their assets hard to 
sell, and concerns about their safety made it impossible to borrow in open markets. As their 
asset-backed commercial paper matured and could not be rolled over, some of the firms break 
down. In other cases, banks chose to rescue the shadow banks that they had created, in order 
to limit legal risks and reputational damage (Cecchetti, 2008). Subsequently banks faced 
elevated liquidity demands and pressures to sell assets when the cost of liquidity had raised 
and asset prices were falling. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Besides commercial banks, large sponsors of conduits also included structured investment groups ($182 
billion), mortgage lenders ($72 billion), and other financial institutions ($79 billion). 
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Graph 3: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (Billions of Dollars), 2001-08; Source: 
Federal Reserve Board. 
 
 
 
4.1. Collapse of asset-backed commercial paper 
The recession in the asset-backed commercial paper was provoked by the crisis in the 
subprime mortgage market. Even though delinquencies on subprime loans had been soaring 
through most of 2006, the crisis revealed its first clear signs only in the second quarter of 
2007. On July 31, 2007, two Bear Stearns’s hedge funds13 that had invested in subprime 
mortgages filed for bankruptcy. In the consecutive week, more revelation about delinquencies 
in subprime mortgages hit the market.  
On August 7, 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from three of its 
mortgage-backed securities funds and suspended calculation of their net asset values 
(Kacperczyk and Shnabl, 2013). This suspension of withdrawals had a deeply negative impact 
on money market instruments. Investors in asset-backed commercial paper became concerned 
about the value of collateral backing of these instruments. Consequently, many investors 
                                                 
13 Hedge funds are alternative investments using pooled funds that may use a number of different strategies in 
order to earn active return, or alpha, for their investors. Hedge funds may be aggressively managed or make use 
of derivatives and leverage in both domestic and international markets with the goal of generating high returns. 
19 
 
stopped refinancing maturing commercial paper, and within two days the spread on overnight 
ABCP over the federal funds interest rate increased exponentially 14(see graph 4). 
 
 
  
 
Graph 4: Spread by Money Market Instrument: Source: Oxford Journals, New York 
University School of Law, July 2013. 
 
Outstanding ABCP shrank by $190 billion (almost 20%) in August, while yields soared and 
maturities shortened for new issues (Campbell, Covitz, Nelson and Pence, 2011). Outstanding 
ABCP fell by an additional $160 billion by the end of the year (see Table I). The contraction 
in outstanding asset-backed commercial paper, combined with the growth in its spread, 
implies that the failure was caused by a drop in demand for, instead than supply of, asset-
backed commercial paper. In line with this interpretation, several money market funds 
reported that they had reduced their holdings of asset-backed commercial paper to mitigate 
the risk of negative publicity, which could cause withdrawals by investors (Moody’s Investor 
                                                 
14   The spread between overnight asset-backed commercial paper and the federal funds interest rate spiked up 
shortly after the crisis started. While in the year before the crisis the average spread equaled 3 basis points, in the 
year after the crisis the average spread rose to 46 basis points. 
20 
 
Service, 2007). Covitz et al. (2013) discuss the trading failure in repo, interbank lending, and 
asset-backed commercial paper markets 
In line with this interpretation, several money market funds reported that they had reduced 
their holdings of asset-backed commercial paper to mitigate the risk of negative publicity, 
which could cause withdrawals by investors (Moody’s Investor Service, 2007). Covitz et al. 
(2013) discuss the trading failure in repo, interbank lending, and asset-backed commercial 
paper markets.  
Money market funds experienced no direct losses from the decrease in asset-backed 
commercial paper. These instruments were insured by commercial banks through liquidity 
guarantees that paid off maturing asset-backed commercial paper in case of a run. Because of 
the credit guarantees, sponsoring financial institutions had to provide liquidity to pay off 
maturing asset-backed commercial paper. This obligation raised concerns about counterparty 
risk among banks and caused interbank lending rates to shoot upwards. The crisis in asset- 
backed commercial paper quickly spread across the financial sector and affected banks 
worldwide (Acharya and Schnabl, 2009).  
 
 
 
Table I: ABCP Program Types; Source: Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2013) 
 
 
21 
 
4.2. The failure of Lehman Brothers 
On September 15, 2008 Lehman brothers filed for bankruptcy with $639 billion in assets and 
$619 billion in debt. This failure was the second major negative shock in the commercial 
paper market. The default of Lehman Brothers was followed by larger withdrawals from 
money-market mutual funds after the Reserve Primary Funds “broke the buck”15, and the 
revelation of the Reserve Fund’s exposure to Lehman’s bankruptcy caused an immediate run 
on the fund. On September 16, 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund was forced to pay out $10.8 
billion in redemptions and faced about $28 billion of further withdrawal requests (Acharya, 
Cooley and Richardson, 2010). The run quickly spread to other money market funds with 
commercial paper holdings. 
The stress felt by money market funds were a prominent feature of the crisis. The run 
experienced by the Reserve Primary Fund spread quickly to other funds, and led to investors 
redeeming over $300 billion within just a few days after the failure of Lehman Brothers. This 
was a surprise at the time it occurred because money-market funds have been traditionally 
regarded as relatively safe. The assumption was that, given the impression of safety, these 
large-scale withdrawals represented some type of market-wide liquidity crisis. The ABCP 
market also experienced considerable stress. Issuers of commercial paper were unable in 
many cases to renew funding when a portion of the commercial paper matured, and some 
have referred to this as a “run” (Covitz, Liang, Suarez, 2013).  As the graph 5 shows, things 
deteriorated quite dramatically in this market beginning from August 2007. 
 
Graph 5: Runs on ABCP Programs; Source: Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2013) 
                                                 
15 When a money market mutual fund's net asset value (NAV) drops below $1 per share. 
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4.3. Evolution of ABCP in the financial crisis 
For investors the Lehman’s bankruptcy was the indication that asset-backed commercial 
paper, issued and funded by financial institutions, was riskier than investors had believed. As 
graph 6 indicates asset-backed commercial paper outstanding dropped by 9.8 percent, from 
$741 billion to $668 billion (Kacperczyk 2013). Commercial paper outstanding decreased 
because the average maturity of commercial paper dropped after Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6: Commercial Paper Outstanding, January 2004-October 2009; Source: 
Kacperczyk and Schnabl analysis based on Federal Reserve Board data. 
 
 
Covitz, Liang and Suarez demonstrate that: - “As total outstanding ABCP plunged by nearly 
30% from August to December 2007 different program types were not hit equally hard. 
Outstanding at multi-seller programs fell only about 10% from July to December, while 
outstanding at SIVs fell about 80% and mortgage single-seller programs virtually 
disappeared.” 
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Bank guarantees played an important role in enabling conduits to issue asset-backed 
commercial paper. Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009) show also that conduits with the weakest 
credit guarantees (“extendible notes” and “SIVs”) had the largest difficulties in rolling over 
their maturing asset-backed commercial paper than the ones with stronger guarantees (“credit 
guarantees” and “liquidity guarantees”)16. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2009) in additional 
demonstrate that financial guarantees provided almost all of the maturing ABCP and 97% of 
asset-backed commercial paper was reimbursed at shorter-term maturity. Issuers defaulted 
only on 3% of asset-backed commercial paper outstanding. Hence, most of the investment 
losses due to the fall in asset prices effectively remained contained with the sponsoring 
financial institutions, not the investors in asset-backed commercial paper. Finally, Covitz, 
Liang, and Suarez (2009) document the “run” in the shadow banking sector and link it to the 
deterioration of asset quality in conduits. Table II furnishes an analysis of all conduits 
authorized to issue asset-backed commercial paper on January 1, 2007. It specifies that there 
are 296 conduits with total ABCP outstanding of $1.235 trillion. The average conduit size is 
$4.2 billion with a standard deviation of $5.2 billion. The largest conduit type is multi-seller 
conduits with $548 billion in ABCP. The second-largest type is credit arbitrage conduits with 
$213 billion in ABCP. The third-largest type is single seller conduits with $173 billion in 
ABCP. 
As Panel A shows, outstanding at multi-seller programs fell only about 10% from July to 
December, while outstanding at SIVs fell about 80% and mortgage single-seller programs 
virtually disappeared. These dramatic declines in outstanding are consistent with the 
possibility that investors were intolerant to risk and that paper issued by certain program types 
may have had some risk. The risk of paper issued by certain program types may have 
reflected relatively weak program characteristics. 
                                                 
16 For example, from July to December 2007, total asset-backed commercial paper issued by structured 
investment vehicles fell from $84 billion to $15 billion. 
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Table II: ABCP: Outstandings, Overnight Risk Spreads, and Average Maturity of New 
Issues, by Program Type; Source: Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2013) 
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4.4. Asymmetric information 
As discussed in Gorton (2008) and Brunnermeier (2009), another factor explaining the 
collapse of certain segments of the ABCP market during the 2007-2009 financial crisis is the 
asymmetric information that arises between the buy-side and the sell-side of structured 
financial products. 
The asymmetric information theory of bank runs focuses on the dissemination of several 
types of information during banking crises. Since banks are involved in the creation of 
nonmarketable assets, they may be difficult to value, and bank managements difficult to 
monitor. So, the use of aggregate knowledge in the absence of bank-specific information 
might result in spill-overs and panics across banks. This exemplifies the “lemons problem”17 
in financial markets, a term coined by Akerlof (1970). Panics are most likely when bad news 
immediately follows a period of high loan demand and sanguine expectations. Panics are 
preceded by prosperity periods, where the leverage of banks and their borrowers is in the 
peak. This explains why in panic periods, adverse news was translated into unusually large 
declines in securities' prices and high borrower-default rates.  
There is, thus, asymmetric information between banks and depositors concerned the 
performance of bank managements and portfolios. In this environment with asymmetric 
information, the panic occurred as follows. Bank depositors received information leading 
them to revise their assessment of the risk of banks, but they didn’t know which individual 
banks were most likely to be affected. Since depositors were unable to distinguish individual 
bank risks, they withdrawn a large volume of deposits from all banks in response to the 
signal. Banks then suspended convertibility and in the period of time that followed banks 
themselves sort out which banks among them were insolvent. 
 
4.5. Runs on asset-backed commercial paper 
As documented by Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2013), asset-backed commercial paper 
programs faced several bank-run episodes during the summer of 2007, implying a lower 
demand for AAA-rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities. Subsequently, it was the turn 
of repo markets, which heavily employed securitized mortgages as collateral, to experience 
runs (Gorton, 2010). As a result of these events the amount of ABCP outstanding in 
                                                 
17 The lemons problem is the issue of information asymmetry between the buyer and seller of an investment or 
product. Lemons problem was popularized by a 1970 research paper by economist George Akerlof. The term is 
derived from Akerlof's demonstration of the concept of asymmetric information through the example of 
defective used cars, which are known as lemons in marketplace. In the investment field, the lemons problem is 
apparent in areas such as insurance and corporate finance 
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contracted by approximately $400 billion between July and December of 2007. Several 
authors have interpreted this event as a run on debt. In a debt run, creditors refuse to roll over 
their debt if they suspect that other creditors will not roll over, in some cases even if the 
borrower is financially stable. 
By July 2007, there was $1.2 trillion of ABCP outstanding, with the majority of the paper 
held by money market mutual funds. Issuers of commercial paper were unable in many cases 
to renew funding when a portion of the commercial paper matured. Debt runs played a central 
role in the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Investors ran on asset-backed commercial paper 
starting in July 2007, on repo starting in September 2007, and on money market mutual funds 
in September 2008 (Covitz, Liang, and Suarez, 2009)18. It appears that the runs suffered by 
money market mutual funds were mainly appears that the runs suffered by money market 
mutual funds were mainly due to asset risk and solvency concerns, rather than a liquidity 
crisis per se. 
The main empirical results taken from Covitz, Liang and Suarez are as follows. First, a 
substantial number of ABCP programs experienced a run in the last 5 months of 2007. About 
30% of programs were in a run within weeks of the onset of the ABCP crisis and more than 
120 programs were in a run at the end of 2007, and the odds of exiting a run were very low. 
Second, runs in the crisis were not random but instead were significantly more likely at riskier 
programs, based on observable program characteristics, program type, sponsor type, and 
macro-financial variables. Third, for the programs that could issue, yield spreads and 
maturities of new issues had explainable variation during the crisis, and the determinants were 
similar to those that help to explain runs. 
The analysis of runs on asset-backed commercial paper programs during the crisis, as well as 
of risk spreads and maturities of programs that were not in a run, reveal substantial 
determinants. Coefficients on program risk characteristics demonstrate that the determinants 
that make a program more likely to experience a run are comparable to the determinants that 
would increase spreads and decrease maturities of issues by programs not in a run (e.g. 
extendibility, number of liquidity providers, and program rating). In terms of program type, 
the coefficients illustrate that runs are less likely and spreads are lower for multi-seller 
programs, while spreads are higher and maturities are shorter for mortgage single-seller 
programs (see graph 7). 
 
 
                                                 
18 Investors in ABCP likely knew little about the actual exposures of individual programs to subprime or other 
risky mortgages, in part because some sponsors viewed their portfolios as proprietary investment strategies. 
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Graph 7: Spreads for Different Program Types; Source: Federal Reserve Board and 
program classification from Moody’s 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed a very large body of research on the causes and effect of the most 
devastating financial crisis since the Great Depression, with the model of Covitz, Liang and 
Suarez being the key ingredient. The increase in the demand for houses and subsequently the 
demand for subprime mortgage was one of the first causes of this financial crisis. It became 
obvious to many investors that liquidation values were lower and that ﬁnancial institutions 
issuing money market instruments were riskier than previously thought. As a result, money 
market fund instruments that were backed by ﬁnancial institutions, bank obligations and 
commercial papers, were perceived as risky and had to offer higher yields. With the house 
pricing growing and new “risky” ways of securitizing subprime loans the market became a 
perfect habitat for a crisis.  
The burst of real estate bubble triggered severe liquidity shortages in many financial 
institutions exposed to real estate and mortgage backed securities. Thus, it is not surprising 
that housing price declines led to a run on the banking system, drying up the asset-backed 
commercial paper market. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was by far the largest decline in 
the commercial paper market, it mostly affected commercial paper issued by financial 
institutions19.  
By the end of 2007, roughly 40% of ABCP conduits had stopped rolling over maturing debt. 
The value of asset-backed commercial papers declined by almost 300 billion dollars during 
the 2007 and the mortgage single-seller program almost disappeared, but different program 
types were not hit equally hard. The amount of asset-backed commercial paper outstanding in 
the U.S. contracted by approximately one third between July and December.  
A possible explanation for these dramatic declines in outstanding asset-backed commercial 
papers is the probability that investors were sensitive to risk and that paper issued by certain 
program types may have had some risk. The proximate cause of runs was mounting concerns 
about exposures of asset-backed commercial paper programs to subprime mortgages. The 
evidences show that runs are sensitive to conduit leverage and expected asset liquidation 
costs. Runs are much less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch, the perceived strength 
of old guarantees, and the assets volatility.  
Moreover, it is clear that runs were not random during this crisis period, but were instead 
more likely among programs with relatively weak characteristics, such as weaker liquidity 
support and lower ratings, and they also appeared to increase with macro-ﬁnancial risks. 
Supporting this argument Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009) illustrate the important role 
                                                 
19 Analysis based on iMoneyNet data shows that, within a week, institutional investors reduced their investments 
in money market funds by more than $172 billion 
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played by bank guarantees in enabling conduits to issue ABCP, by showing that rollovers of 
ABCP that had weaker guarantees were more difficult during the crisis than that of ABCP 
with stronger guarantees. It appears that the crisis resulted from the interaction of many 
factors: low interest rates, facilities for mortgage lenders, misjudgments from rating 
companies, risky backed securities and asymmetric information. As a result, asset-backed 
commercial paper provides a useful laboratory to study financial fragility. 
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7. Appendix 
The fundamentals of asset-backed commercial papers: 
 
 
 
Source: DTTC and Moody’s Investor Services 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Riassunto in italiano 
Questa tesi fa una revisione della letteratura sulla crisi 2007-09 e tratta lo stato del mondo 
prima crisi, le cause, gli eventi verificatisi durante la stessa e gli effetti dell’uso delle carte 
commerciali cartolarizzate (dall’inglese Asset Backed Commercial Paper, d’ora in avanti 
ABCP).  
Le condizioni pre-crisi hanno contribuito alla bolla dei prezzi delle abitazioni, e il successivo 
calo dei prezzi ha portato ad una crisi nella quale la liquidità si è ridotta generando problemi 
di insolvenza. Piuttosto che vendere i mutui o i titoli cartolarizzati direttamente nei mercati 
finanziari, alcune grandi banche li hanno spostati in piccole imprese, fuori dai loro bilanci, e 
hanno finanziato tali imprese mediante l'emissione di carte cartolarizzate (commercial paper). 
Il risultato è stato un aumento senza precedenti del volume degli ABCP dal 2005 fino a metà 
2007, momento in cui il crollo finanziario ha avuto inizio. 
Questo documento fornisce una completa introduzione ai programmi delle carte commerciali 
cartolarizzate, concentrandosi sulla loro struttura di base, sui rischi ed i fondi cartolarizzati al 
loro interno, nonché le attività tipiche acquistate o finanziate per mezzo di queste. 
Analizzando il ruolo degli ABCP nel mercato finanziario è possibile comprendere le 
implicazioni a cui sono state soggette le banche come fornitori di liquidità per i conduits 
(veicoli di investimento che emettono commercial paper a breve termine per finanziare gli 
impieghi a lungo termine fuori bilancio delle banche).  
Il rischio del mancato rinnovamento degli ABCP è stato un fattore rilevante nella fase iniziale 
della crisi finanziaria. In particolare, si è generata una certa agitazione quando, nell’estate del 
2007, gli investitori/acquirenti di ABCP hanno realizzato la presenza di asimmetrie 
informative sul valore reale di tali strumenti finanziari. 
Rendimenti sostanziosi, maturità a breve termine e un ottimo rating fecero apparire gli ABCP 
agli occhi degli acquirenti come un’ottima opportunità di investimento. La presa di coscienza 
del valore reale delle carte commerciali cartolarizzate ha causato un calo immediato del 
mercato e il commercio di tali prodotti si è prosciugato.  
Il picco discendente dei volumi degli ABCP è iniziato nel terzo trimestre del 2007 ed è 
proseguito per un anno. Da agosto 2007 ad agosto 2008, il valore totale delle carte 
commerciali cartolarizzate è sceso del 37%, da 1.18 trilioni a 745 miliardi di dollari. Questo 
studio dimostra che, mentre la crisi si espandeva, il calo del mercato della carta commerciale 
cartolarizzata e la corsa agli sportelli, sono fortemente correlati con la percezione del rischio 
da parte degli investitori. 
 
 
  
Questo documento ha esaminato un ampio corpo di ricerche sulle cause e gli effetti della crisi 
finanziaria più devastante dopo la Grande Depressione, dove il modello di Covitz, Liang e 
Suarez rappresenta il nucleo principale dell’analisi. L’aumento di acquisti di abitazioni e della 
successiva domanda di mutui subprime è stata una delle prime cause di questa crisi 
finanziaria.  
Il prezzo delle abitazioni in costante crescita, i nuovi rischiosi metodi di cartolarizzazione dei 
mutui subprime uniti alla presa di coscienza del reale valore degli ABCP, da parte degli 
investitori, che ha costretto le istituzioni finanziarie emittenti ad alzarne i rendimenti, hanno 
creato l’habitat perfetto per il proliferare della crisi. 
Lo scoppio della bolla immobiliare ha innescato gravi carenze di liquidità a molte istituzioni 
finanziarie esposte nel settore immobiliare e nei prestiti garantiti dai titoli. Così, non è 
sorprendente che le riduzioni dei prezzi delle abitazioni abbiano portato ad una corsa agli 
sportelli, prosciugando il mercato degli ABCP. La crisi finanziaria del 2007-2009 è di gran 
lunga il più considerevole declino del mercato dei commercial paper, in particolar modo 
quelli emessi da istituzioni finanziarie. 
Nel caso di ABCP, circa il 40% dei conduits hanno smesso di rinnovare debiti a scadenza 
entro la fine del 2007. Tutto il settore dei conduits è stato colpito più o meno duramente, in 
particolare, i conduits a venditore singolo sono quasi scomparsi.  
La quantità di ABCP negli Stati Uniti si è contratta di circa 400 miliardi di $ (un terzo) tra 
luglio e dicembre del 2007. Una possibile spiegazione di questi cali drammatici può essere 
legata alla sensibilità degli investitori rispetto al rischio di controparte, insito nella natura dei 
conduits, o alla paura che tali prodotti potessero essere collegati ai mutui subprime. 
Le dismissioni di ABCP si sono verificate più frequentemente per prodotti emessi da conduits 
con caratteristiche relativamente deboli, quali scarsa disponibilità liquida, basso rating e/o 
possibile collegamento a rischi finanziari sistemici. A supporto di questa tesi Acharya, 
Schnabl e Suarez (2009) illustrano il ruolo importante svolto dalle garanzie bancarie per 
consentire ai conduits di emettere ABCP, mostrando che, durante la crisi, per ABCP con 
garanzie deboli i rollover erano più difficili rispetto agli ABCP con maggiori garanzie. 
Sembra che la crisi sia stata provocata dall'interazione di molti fattori: i tassi di interesse 
bassi, facilitazioni nell’erogazione dei mutui ipotecari, errori di valutazione dalle società di 
rating, titoli garantiti rischiosi e informazioni asimmetriche. Di conseguenza, la carta 
commerciale cartolarizzata fornisce un laboratorio utile per studiare la fragilità finanziaria. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
